In August of 1919, 37-year old Charles P. Bianchi of Boston received a piece of mail that included a "postal reply coupon." He had never seen one before, though at the time such coupons were widely used to simplify the pre-payment of return postage for mail sent abroad. Recipients would trade the coupons for postage stamps, according to an established currency exchange rate.
Bianchi looked into these transactions, and discovered that post-WWI currency devaluations had created disparities against the established exchange rate. He realized he could game the system – arbitrage it, if you will, for a legal profit. He began telling people about his discovery. And, without revealing too many details, Bianchi also said that the more money he had the more he could make.
Word spread. Bianchi began promising 50% returns in 45 days, or double in 90. Within six months some 10,000 people had trusted $9.5 million to him. Soon he bought a mansion (with air-conditioning and a heated swimming pool) in Boston's finest neighborhood. He was careful to pay back as promised the relative few investors who wanted their money when the 45 or 90 days was up. But he convinced the vast majority not to take immediate profits, and instead roll their claim back into his enterprise.
The con fell apart within a few brief days in August 1920. Bianchi – also known as Charles Ponzi – was charged with 86 counts of fraud. Best estimates say that a third of the funds were returned. Ponzi finished his prison term in 1934.
The past year has seen scattered stories about failed hedge funds, but in the past month the number of those stories has accelerated. It would be easy to plug names and dates from today's news into the narrative above, and leave several details about the con untouched. These hedge funds began as legal businesses that identified arbitrage opportunities, promised inflated returns, paid as promised those few investors who got out early, and then imploded with stunning speed.
Obviously, hedge funds are designed for investors with a high tolerance for risk, which is why so many of these funds include subprime "assets" in their portfolios. But the truly modern twist to today's Ponzi schemes is this: Many money market funds have also been infected by subprime "assets."
Money market funds are supposed to be for investors who have the opposite of a "high tolerance for risk" – but credit rating agencies (such as S&P and Moody's) gave AAA ratings to a lot of the repacked debt that has subprime mortgages in the mix. A Bloomberg news story today said, "Money market funds with total assets of $300 billion have invested in subprime debt this year."
News like this usually runs after the stories that quote "officials" who find new ways to say the "worst is over." We encourage you to think for yourself about what type of story is more important. Come see what we see, and there won't be any doubt in your mind.